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Flag selection is not just a crucial decision with regard to ship operation, but also 
plays an important role in national and international maritime policy. This study 
uses individual ship registration data to analyze flag selection behaviour, 
including flagging out decision using a binary choice model, and final flag choice 
by applying a nested logit model. Operators from traditional maritime countries 
are found to flag out high quality vessels, whereas those from open-registry 
countries tend to flag out low quality ones. Flag preferences are more sensitive to 
the registration fee than to the annual due; full-open flags are more elastic than 
quasi-open ones; and substitution among flags within the same group is higher  
than across different groups. Port State Control, Flag State Control and safety 
records have opposite impacts on flag choice for ships from closed registry 
countries and those from open registers.   
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1. Introduction 
Selecting a nationality for a ship has always been the first decision for her owner, ever 
since it became possible for a ship to have a nationality different from that of its owner. 
The motivations for selecting a flag have also evolved from simply seeking protection 
from maritime powers and avoiding hostile trade partners, to a complicated chemical 
cocktail: Avoiding strict regulations, increasing competitive advantages, escaping 
national taxation and hiding identities (Metaxas, 1981; Thuong, 1987; Bertaintino & 
Marlow, 1998). Open register—making the national flag readily available to foreign 
owned or operated vessels—has also become a revenue generating measure for some 
countries (Li & Wonham, 1999a). As a result, the proportion of vessels flying a flag that 
is different from the nationality of their owners or operators (subsequently referred to as 
foreign-flagged vessels) has grown continuously from 21.6% in the 1970s to 67% in 2008 
(UNCTAD 1997-2008).  
This high proportion of foreign-flagged vessels in the world fleet, together with 
changing behaviour in flag selection, has significant implications, not only for public 
maritime policies at both national and international levels, but also for business strategies 
in the private sector. Traditional maritime countries are concerned about the shrinking of 
their national fleet, declining tax revenues, falling employment in the maritime sector and 
adverse effects on national security. For example, according to the Lloyd’s Register 
database, 59.2% of the US vessels by number, or 76% in DWT (deadweight ton, a 
measure of cargo carrying capacity), are under a foreign flag. Faced with a similar 
problem, the Chinese government has initiated a tax-exemption policy to attract foreign-
flagged vessels back to Chinese registration. 2
Flag State Control (FSC) ― the regulatory control of the state over the vessels flying 
its flag ― is supposed to enforce various national and international conventions on 
shipping. However, most of the open registry countries do not seriously enforce these 
conventions. This provides ship operators/owners with opportunities to avoid 
requirements, which can lead to unseaworthy vessels and thus impaired safety in 
maritime transportation. Realizing this problem, the International Maritime Organization 
and the coastal states initiated Port State Control (PSC) as a supplement to FSC, with a 
view to controlling the standard of ships. However, due to limited resources for 
conducting vessel inspections, the PSC assigns priorities to those ships whose flag states 
have bad reputations, mostly those of open registers that have very loose shipping 
standards. Given that owners or operators will also try to avoid vessel inspection and 
potential detention in ports, how can the PSC/FSC effectively influence their flag choice 
behaviour? 
 However, will such a policy have the 
desired effect?  
From the perspective of private business, the selection of a flag is a primary step for a 
successful shipping operation. Competition in the international shipping market mandates 
that the ship owner/operator has to cut costs in all ways possible, and open register is 
simply the magic wand that has made such dreams come true. Moreover, this wand has 
also opened a door that can lead to lax enforcement in ship safety regulation, which may 
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provide further cost savings, but may also lead to a higher frequency of PSC inspection. 
How do ship owners/operators make tradeoffs between cost savings and flexibility, with 
the resulting potential safety hazards and possible inconvenience?   
A review of previous studies of flag selection behaviour, provided in section two, 
reveals some important issues. Firstly, neither the flag selection decision makers, nor the 
open registers, are homogeneous, and the same policy of an open registry country may 
have different implications for vessels from different countries. At the same time, the 
decision maker for the ship’s flag may not have the same probability of choosing any of 
the open registers. Therefore, the statistical model applied to analyze flag selection 
behaviour has to accommodate both non-homogeneous decision makers and non-
homogeneous open registers. Secondly, having decided to flag out, the decision makers 
also have to decide which flag to choose from among all the potential open registry 
countries—bearing in mind that they each provide different services and have different 
requirements.  
This study addresses the above-mentioned issues by applying a binary choice model to 
the flag-out decision, and a nested logit model to the flag choice for foreign-flagged 
vessels in the world merchant fleet. A major advantage of this study is that it uses 
observable data to reveal the preference of the decision maker for the flag country. 
Therefore, it is free from the bias that is a common problem when using survey data. 
Besides this, logit models are consistent with the random utility framework. Therefore, it 
is possible to estimate tradeoffs between certain non-monetary policies, such as 
requirements for crews’ nationalities, with financial motivations, such as savings in 
registration fees and taxes. This provides an economic valuation of maritime policies, an 
important factor in policy analysis.  In short, the findings from this paper contribute to the 
understanding of a) how the private companies select a flag for their vessels based on the 
trade-off between economic and safety attributes of the flag, and b) how the choice 
differs when the operators are from a traditional maritime country (or a closed registry) 
and when they are from open-registry countries. 
In the next section, we will first discuss existing literature on open registries, as well 
as on the methodology used in our research. Section three introduces the development of 
the statistical model; section four describes the data processing; section five reports on 
the model estimation results and discussions; and section six concludes. 
 
2. Literature review  
Due to the popularity of open registry, and its significant impact on the maritime 
industry from the perspectives of both private business operation and public policy, 
numerous studies have discussed the issue. Early research into open registration focused 
on the economics of such a practice. Metaxas (1981) reviewed the history of FOC (Flags 
of Convenience, a term used by many for “open registry”), and discussed benefits and 
costs from three different perspectives—the world community, and the national 
economies of both traditional maritime states and countries of registration. He concluded 
that the costs of the FOC institution far outweighed its benefits. Yannopoulos (1988)  
studied labour cost factors in traditional maritime countries and foreign-flagged vessels, 
using a two-sector general equilibrium model. The policy recommendation was that the 
real labour costs should be reduced for vessels flying the national flag of a traditional 
maritime country.  
Major public concerns at the international level pertain to the safety standards of 
vessels under open resisters, and the fair treatment of seafarers (Gianni, 2008; Coles & 
Watt, 2009). Concerning the impact of open-registration on maritime safety, existing 
studies have tried to identify the correlation between a vessel’s flag and its safety record. 
Alderton and Winchester (2002) examined the casualty rates of flag states in the Lloyd’s 
casualty database from 1997 to 1999, and found that FOCs do have a worse safety record. 
Li and Wonham (1999b) also found that open-registry ships are more likely to be 
substandard. However, they also pointed out that not all open-register ships are the same, 
and some open registers have an acceptable safety record. On the effectiveness of PSC, 
Cariou et al. (2008) used 4080 observations from the Swedish Maritime Administration 
during 1996-2001 and found that PSC inspections can reduce the number of deficiencies. 
Regarding the possible choices for ship registration, Coles & Watt (2009, p.55) stated 
that there are three alternatives: (1) the ship register of a country with which the ship 
owner has some genuine connection; (2) an open registry; or (3) the second/international 
register. Alternatives (1) and (3) are similar in terms of the genuine economic link, 
because second registers are not open to foreign vessels.  Therefore, we merged them into 
one group in this study. In addition, we divided the open registers into two groups, to take 
into account the possible heterogeneity among the open registers.    
To understand the major factors involved in a vessel’s flag-out decision, many 
different approaches have been applied in existing research, including the Markov chain 
model for the flag-out process in the Netherlands shipping fleet (Veenstra & Bergaintino, 
2000), the discrete choice model on surveyed data (Bertaintino & Marlow, 1998), and the 
fuzzy set theory on surveyed data (Haralambides & Yang, 2003). Although a well-
designed survey can solicit unobservable data by asking the participants’ opinions, the 
flag hanging on each ship is the best indicator of the preference of its decision maker. In 
this regard, Hoffmann et al. (2005) applied a binominal probit model to analyze ship 
operators’ flagging out behaviour, using actual ship registration data for 47,740 
commercial vessels from the Lloyd’s Register database, and a binary choice model for 
flag choice for eight specific Latin American and Caribbean open registries.  
This study applies a binary choice model to study the flagging out behaviour, and a 
nested logit model for the selection of a specific flag from among many potential 
alternatives, all under the random utility framework. Nested logit models have been 
widely used in many different areas, including marketing (Kannan & Wright, 1991; 
McFadden, 1980), transportation (Lo et al., 2004), and resource economics (Carson et al., 
2009), where the potential alternatives exhibit structural differences. Kannan and Wright  
(1991) applied a nested logit model to study how consumers select coffee products, 
following a decision tree of three levels: Caffeinated or decaffeinated at the first level; 
types of coffee at the second level (regular, drip or electric perk); and brand-size 
combinations at the third level. In a transportation study, Lo et al. (2004) used the nested 
logit approach to modelling combined-model choices of travellers, following a three-
level nested logit structure: Mode choice, transfer mode choice and route choice. In 
resource economics, Carson et al. (2009) applied the nested logit model in studying the 
behaviour for fish site selection, when analyzing the recreational fishing demand in 
Alaska. They assumed that the decision tree for resident anglers to select where to go for 
fishing includes four levels: Whether or not to go sport fishing; what the targeted fish 
type is; what the targeted fish species is; and which site to go to. In our study, we assume 
that the ship registration decision maker will first decide whether or not to flag-out, 
followed by a decision on which type of foreign flag to choose, and finally the choice of a 
flag. The next section introduces the formulation of the model.    
 
3.  Model formulation 
This section explains the model specification based on the decision making process of 
selecting a nationality for a vessel. Through a discussion on the decision-making process 
of flag choice, we first present the binary choice model for the flagging out decision, then 
the formulation of the nested logit model for flag choices. 
3.1. Flag choice behaviour 
In this paper, we assume that decision makers have three choices with regard to ship 
registration. The first is to fly a “national flag”, i.e., to register the vessel in a country 
with which the ship owner has some genuine connection by way of national or economic 
ties. This choice reflects that the decision maker weights the “genuine link” more than the 
benefits of the open registration system.  
Open registries are not homogeneous. While many treat ship registration simply as a 
vehicle for increasing national income, some do impose a high standard on ships flying 
their flags (Toh & Phang, 1993; Hill Dickinson LLP, 2008). We define the former group 
as “full-open” registries, and the latter one as “quasi-open” registers. Full-open registers 
provide maximum cost saving possibilities, will accept all vessels regardless of their 
current vessel classification, and will provide total flexibility with regard to the 
enforcement of safety, environmental and labour regulations. Examples of such open 
registers include Panama and Liberia; virtually all ships can fly their flags. Selecting this 
option implies that the decision maker assigns a high weight to the flexibility and cost 
savings provided by open register. Quasi-open registers, on the other hand, offer most of 
the flexibility of an open register, while at the same time imposing high requirements on 
the quality of the ships flying their flags. Such open registers include Hong Kong and 
Singapore. Choosing this alternative indicates that the decision maker seeks to enjoy 
certain cost savings offered by open registry while at the same time avoiding the poor 
safety reputation associated with open registers.  
Those who make flagging out decisions are not homogeneous either. They come to the 
decision with experience of different environments and regulations and hence will 
naturally have different considerations when deciding to choose a foreign flag. 
Furthermore, not all ship owners are the actual operators, and there is no information 
available regarding who actually selected the flag. In cases where the ship owner is just 
an investor, it is unlikely that he or she will be the decision maker. In addition, since the 
Lloyd’s ship register database indicates that 79.4% of vessels have operators who are 
from the same country as the owners, in this research the operator’s country is considered 
the ship’s country of origin.   
To test the possible differences between the operators from different countries (both 
closed registry countries and open registry countries), the sample data is organized into 
two different groups according to the property of the country (closed or open), of the 
operator. For each group, we analyze the flag-out and flag selection decision following 
the decision tree depicted in Figure 1. The upper part analyzes the flag-out decision using 
a binary choice model, while the lower part uses a nested logit model to analyze how to 
select a flag from among all the major open registries. We put the flag-out decision at the 
top in order to show the hierarchical structure of the alternatives. When deciding whether 
or not to flag out, the decision maker is assumed to be in possession of all information 
about all possible alternatives, and is able to calculate the expected utility of flagging out. 
Finally, two separate models are applied to these two sections. These are introduced next.  
 
Figure 1. Decision tree for vessel flag choice 
 
3.2 The binary choice model for a flagging out decision 
We model the decision for flag-out using a binary choice logit model. The model 
assumes utility maximization in the operator’s flag decision. The specification of the 
utility function is the key to the estimation process, because it leads to the specification of 
the probability. Following Greene (2008), the utility for ship i to select flag n can be 
written as Uin=Vin+ε, where Vin is the observable utility based on a set of observable 
factors. These factors include the policies and economic and geographical conditions of 
both the national country and other flag countries. The last part, ε, is an unobservable 
random variable with extreme value distribution (Train, 2003, p.80). Using dummy 
variable yi for flying a foreign flag, and Uif and Uin to represent the utility for flying a foreign flag and national flag respectively, if Uif >Uin, then yi=1; otherwise, yi=0.  
Then the probability for a ship i to fly a foreign flag is: 
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This follows the standard definition of a binary choice logit model. From this probability 
function, the likelihood function can be specified. The parameters in the observable 
utility function can then be estimated using maximum likelihood estimation.  
3.3 The nested logit model for flag choices 
The behaviour of decision makers in selecting a particular foreign flag from among many 
open registries (the lower part in Figure 1) is analyzed using a nested logit model. This 
assumes that the decision makers will select the foreign flag that can provide the highest 
utility, and that there are possible structural differences among the open registry 
countries.  
Having determined to flag out, the decision maker for the ith vessel is now facing J 
potential open registry countries to choose from, with JF flags in the full-open nest and JQ 
flags in the quasi-open nest, as shown in the lower part of Figure 1. The utility for ship i 
of country n to choose flag j includes two parts: The nest specific utility Wik; and the 
choice specific utility Yij, where k∈{F,Q} is the index for a specific nest. The probability 
to choose a nest k is 
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in nest k, and τk  the coefficient to be estimated. The inclusive value is designed to 
capture the influence of the alternative specific attributes in each nest on the selection of 
the nest. The τkIk is actually the expected utility of nest k (Train, 2003). The conditional 
probability for the ith ship to select flag j in group k is  
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Then the likelihood of all the ships to choose the flag that they are actually flying can be 
written as ∏∏
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maximum likelihood method to estimate the parameters, including β, τ, and σ.  
One criterion for choosing the nested logit model is the IIA (Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives) property of the alternatives. If IIA holds, the decision between 
two alternatives is independent of the existence of more (or fewer) alternatives. This 
statistic is )'ˆˆ(]ˆˆ[)'ˆˆ( 12 fsfsfs VV ββββχ −−−=
− , where s indicates the estimators based on 
the restricted subset, f indicates the full set of choices, and SVˆ  and fVˆ  are the estimates of 
the covariance matrices separately (Hausman & McFadden, 1984; Greene, 2008). This 
statistic has a χ2-distribution with degrees of freedom being the rank of ( fS VV ˆˆ − ). 
The advantage of using a nested logit model is that it does not require IIA (Train, 
2003) for the alternatives across nests. Therefore, it can capture the higher probability of 
substitution for the open registries with similar attributes (for example, in the quasi-open 
nest), which can better reflect the decision making process behind flag choice in the real 
world.   
4. Data description 
The data source for all the commercial cargo vessels is the PC Register of ships from 
Lloyd’s Register, which consists of 120,000 vessels of 100 GT (Gross Tonnage) and 
above. In our analysis, 48,477 vessels of more than 400GT were selected, as smaller 
vessels are mainly engaged in coastwise trade, and are seldom flagged out. Figure 2 
summarizes the composition of the selected ships by the decision makers’ country of 
origin and the nature of the flag. It indicates that more than 86% of the ships are from 
closed registry countries. Of these, 45% per cent are flying their national flag, while 48% 
of ships from open registry countries are flying a foreign flag.  
 
Figure 2. Distribution of ship nationalities and flag nationalities for selected vessels. 
Among the selected vessels, 54% (26,366), from both closed and open registry 
countries, are flagged out. Table 1 lists the open registers and their fleet nationality 
distribution by number of ships. It shows that the top 14 open registers have around 93% 
of the open-registered vessels. These 14 countries are the main focus of this study. Ships 
that are flying the second register of their own country are considered to be flying their 
national flag, while those registered in other countries’ second ship registers are 
considered flagged out. 
For foreign-flagged vessels originating from closed registry countries, 82% are 
concentrated in the top 13 registry countries,  namely Panama, Liberia, Malta, Antigua, 
Marshall Islands,  Cyprus,  Saint Vincent,  Isle of Man,  Gibraltar, Bahamas, Hong Kong,  
Table 1:  Distribution of fleet nationality (by ship number) for world open registers 
  Countries National Foreign Cumulative  Countries National Foreign Cumulative  
1 Panama 464 7494 32.5% 18 Philippines 541 150 96.3% 
2 Liberia 72 2964 45.4% 19 Cayman Islands 1 142 96.9% 
3 Malta 23 1734 52.9% 20 Netherlands Antilles 22 121 97.4% 
4 Marshall Islands 119 1569 59.7% 21 Bermuda 7 117 97.9% 
5 Antigua 4 1469 66.1% 22 France (FIS)   101 98.4% 
6 Bahamas 28 1276 71.7% 23 Mongolia   94 98.8% 
7 Hong Kong 585 1091 76.4% 24 Barbados   92 99.2% 
8 Singapore 808 924 80.4% 25 Vanuatu   55 99.4% 
9 Cyprus 187 920 84.4% 26 Korea (North) 136 43 99.6% 
10 Cambodia 15 665 87.3% 27 Bolivia 2 26 99.7% 
11 St Vincent 16 516 89.5% 28 Jamaica 1 25 99.8% 
12 Isle of Man 11 325 90.9% 29 Sri Lanka 22 15 99.9% 
13 Gibraltar 5 307 92.3% 30 Tonga 1 15 100.0% 
14 Honduras 73 192 93.1% 31 Sao Tome et Principe 4 5 100.0% 
15 Belize 9 222 94.1% 32 Lebanon 35 4 100.0% 
16 Georgia 5 189 94.9% 33 Equatorial Guinea 2 2 100.0% 
17 Comoros 3 169 95.6% 34 Mauritius 2  100.0% 
Source: Compiled from Gianni (2008) and Lloyd’s Fairplay 2009. 
 
Singapore and Cambodia. For foreign-flagged vessels originating from open registry 
countries, 76% are flying the one of the above flags, except Gibraltar.  
Table 2 lists all the variables used for analyzing both the flag-out decision (with the 
dependent variable FC) and the flag choice (with the dependent variable CHOICE). It 
includes four groups: Vessel attributes, characteristics for the country of origin, 
characteristics of open registers, and the variables representing the difference between the 
country of origin and the open registers.  
In vessel attributes, the dummy variable BUILTOPER is included to check if the 
flagging-out behaviour of a ship is correlated to where it is built. The 48,477 vessels in 
our analysis were built in 79 countries. Among them, 70% were built in four major 
shipbuilding countries, namely Japan, China, Korea (South) and Germany. Of these, 46% 
are operated by a company in the same country.  
The variable LDWT is used to test whether bigger ships are more likely to flag out 
than smaller ones. Among all the ships in this analysis, 48% are smaller vessels of less 
than 10,000 DWT. The current database shows that fewer smaller vessels (38%) are 
flagged out compared with larger vessels (69%).  
The REAGE is devised to test whether older vessels are more likely to flag-out than 
newer ones. The data shows that both new ships (less than 10 years of age) and old ships 
(older than 20 years) have more than a 50% flagging out rate in each age class. However, 
ships between 10 and 20 years of age have less than a 50% flagging-out rate.  
The ship-type dummy variables BULK, TANKER and CONTAINER are included to 
test whether ships of different type have different flag selection behaviours. The 
reference ship type is dry cargo vessel, which includes roro, reefer, combination and 
miscellaneous vessel types. According to our analysis, container vessels have the highest 
flag-out ratio (76%), followed by bulkers (63%), tankers (50%), and dry cargo vessels 
(46%).    
Table 2:  Variable definitions  
  Measurement 
Dependent variables 
FC 1 if vessel flag country is foreign, 0 otherwise 
CHOICE 1 if vessel chooses the particular flag, 0 otherwise 
Independent variables 
  Vessel attributes 
BUILTOPER 1 if the vessel operator’s country is where the vessel was built, 0 otherwise 
LDWT Log of the vessel carrying capacity in DWT 
REAGE Vessel age when registered, in years 
BULK, TANKER and 
CONTAINER  
Dummy variables for bulk, tanker and container respectively. Dry cargo is the base 
dummy. 
CNIK, CGEL, CLLR, CBUV, 
CDNV, CABS, CCCS, 
CRUS, CSKR and CREI 
Dummy variables for Nippon Kaiji Kyokai,  Germanischer Lloyd, Lloyds Registry, 
Bureau Veritas, Det Norske Veritas, American Bureau of Shipping, China Classification 
Society, Russian Maritime Register of Shipping, South Korean Register, and Registro 
Italiano, respectively. All non-IACS are treated as base dummy.  
  Characteristics for the country of origin 
TOPMARTAX1 The top marginal tax rate imposed by the government on high income levels. Average from 2000-2006. 
LGDPCAP Log of the GDP per capita of the vessel’s national country 
AFRICA, ASIA, EUROPE, 
AMERICA, and OCEANIA Dummy variables for vessels from Asia, Europe, America, and Oceania respectively. 
Characteristics for open registers 
LRFEE Log of vessel's registration fee  
LAFEE Log of vessel's annual due fee  
Panama, Liberia, Malta, 
Antigua, Marshall Islands, 
Bahamas, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Cyprus, Cambodia, 
St Vincent, Isle of Man, 
Gibraltar, Honduras 
Dummy variables representing each open register 
Difference variables between the country of origin and the open registry country 
DFSPERFORM2 
 
Sum of the black ‘blobs’ indicated by the table (except the No. of non-IACS bodies) for 
each vessel operator's country. The higher the value, the worse the performance of the 
country. 
DLOSSRATE3 The average marine loss rate from 1998 to 2007, 1/100 
DINSPECT4 Flag country's inspection rate for different vessels  
DAREA 1 if the country of origin and flag country are in the same area 
DCOMPANY5 Vessel registration requirement for the holding company share, scaled from 1 to 5 
DCREW5 Vessel registration crew requirement, scaled from 1 to 5 
Note: 
1. Source: Economic Freedom of the World: Annual Report Economic Freedom Network 2000-2006. 
2. Source: Shipping Industry Flag State Performance Table (BIMCO 2009). 
3. Source: World Casualty Statistics (Lloyd’s fairplay 1998-2007). 
4. The average annual inspect times by Tokyo MOU from 2000 to 2008 and Paris MOU from 2005 to 2008. 
5. The detailed requirements for company equity and crew nationality are listed in Table 3. 
 
Information on the classification society of a ship is used to check how the quality of a 
ship is related to the flag-out decision. The dummy variable indicates 10 members of the 
International Association of Classification Society (IACS). These members impose high 
standards when granting vessel certificates. Therefore, ships bearing their classification 
certificate are generally believed to be high quality vessels (Hoffmann et al., 2005; Li et 
al., 2009). Our data shows that around 70% of the ships are under IACS classification. Of 
these IACS classified vessels, 66% are in closed registry countries and 55% are in open 
registry countries.  
In the variable groups that represent the characteristics of country of origin, the 
average TOPMARTAX is about 42% for closed registers and 25% for open registers. 
This indicates that, on average, the tax rates for closed registers are higher than for open 
registers. The average GDPCAP in closed registry countries (US$18,706) is also higher 
than that in open registers (US$18,012). The high value of GDPCAP may be due to the 
fact that most of the large shipping countries have a high Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
per capita.  
For the characteristics of open registers, the registration fee and annual due are 
included so as to test the substitution among different flags. They are not used in the flag-
out decision analysis because complete information concerning these two variables is not 
available for the closed registry countries.  
Finally, for the difference variables between the country of origin and the open 
registry country, we included two policy factors, COMPANY and CREW, because these 
are perceived to exert significant influence on vessels’ flag choices. These two variables 
represent a flag country’s requirements with regard to the equity of the company and the 
nationalities of the crew of the ships flying its flag. Table 3 lists the values of these two 
variables. Due to their direct impact on a ship’s operating costs, these two variables have 
important implications when selecting a flag. For example, China’s ship registration 
imposes very strict requirements on the equity of the company and the nationality of its 
crew. It is one of the most stringent in the world (Li & Wonham, 1999b; Hill Dickinson 
LLP, 2008). To register a ship under the Chinese flag, the owning company’s foreign 
investment should be less than 50%, and all the crew members should be Chinese. 
Another strict registration is that of the United States. For a ship to fly a US flag, the 
owning company should have at least 50% US equity. The officers and 75% of the crew 
onboard should be US citizens. In contrast to the closed registers, open registry countries 
do not usually impose restrictions on equity or crew nationality, or they impose very low 
restrictions.  
In order to capture the impact of FSC, PSC and vessel safety record on flag choice, 
our model also uses three variables on FSC performance, PSC inspection rate and the loss 
rate between the country of origin and the open registers. In our dataset, the average score 
for the FSC performance of closed registry countries is 2.96, which is greater than that 
for open registers (2.56). This indicates that, on average, open registry countries may 
have better FSC performance than closed ones. Regarding loss rate, the average for 
closed registry countries is 0.087%, which is lower than for open registers at 0.135%. For 
the PSC inspection rate of each individual country, we use data from Paris and Tokyo 
MoUs,3
3 MoU stands for Memorandum of Understanding. These two MoUs are the agreements among maritime 
administrations in Asia and Europe regarding the inspection of foreign-flagged vessels calling at their ports 
according to international conventions.  The USA is not a member country of the PSC.  
 the two largest MoUs in the world accounting for approximately 75-80% of the 
world’s PSC inspections. The inspection record shows that the top 10 most frequently 
inspected countries are all open registers, which accounts for around 74% of the total 
inspections in these two MoUs.  
Table 3: Flag country's requirements on the equity of the company and the nationality of the crew 
Country A B Country A B Country A B 
Antigua and Barbuda 1 1 Norway NIS 1 1 Maldives 4 . 
Australia 1 5 Panama 1 1 Netherlands 4 2 
Bahamas 1 1 Sri Lanka 1 3 Suriname 4 2 
Barbados 1 1 St Vincent 1 1 Dominican Republic 4 4 
Belize 1 1 Syria 1 4 Thailand 4 4 
Bermuda 1 2 
United 
Kingdom 1 2 Austria 4 1 
Cambodia 1 1 Vanuatu 1 1 India 4 5 
Cayman Islands 1 1 Bulgaria 3 3 Morocco 4 5 
Cyprus 1 2 Gabon 3 5 Papua New Guinea 4 4 
Denmark 1 2 Luxembourg 3 1 Switzerland 4 1 
Egypt 1 5 Madagascar 4 5 Ethiopia 5 5 
France 1 2 Poland 3 5 Ghana 5 . 
Gibraltar 1 1 Togo 3 5 Iraq 5 5 
Honduras 1 1 Iran 3 3 Mexico 5 5 
Hong Kong 3 1 Qatar 3 . Russia 5 5 
Isle of Man 1 1 Saudi Arabia 3 3 Yemen 5 . 
Italy 1 5 Senegal 3 5 Bangladesh 4 . 
Jamaica 1 1 Tunisia 3 5 Belgium 4 5 
Japan 1 1 Argentina 4 4 China 4 5 
Jordan 1 1 Brazil 4 4 Greece 4 4 
Liberia 1 1 Colombia 4 4 Malaysia 4 5 
Madeira 1 1 Iceland 4 . Sweden 4 4 
Malta 1 1 Korea (South) 4 . United States of America 4 4 
Marshall Islands 1 1 Nicaragua 4 4 Finland 4 2 
Mauritius 1 1 Norway 4 4 Germany 5 5 
Netherlands Antilles 1 1 Philippines 4 5 Singapore 3 3 
Note: The numerical value for company and crew are calculated from requirements for company 
equity (A) and crew nationality (B): 1 for no requirement, 5 for the strictest requirement. 
Sources: Compiled from Li and Wonham (1999) and Hill Dickinson LLP (2008).  
 
5. Empirical results 
This section presents and explains the statistical results for the flag-out and flag-choice 
analyses. Following the assumptions regarding the decision making process, the flag-out 
decision is explained first. After that, the factors involved in determining the flag choice 
are outlined. The results for operators from open registry countries are presented 
alongside those from closed registry countries, and a further explanation is given if they 
are significantly different. 
5.1. Results from the binary choice model of the flag-out decision  
Table 4 presents the estimated coefficients of the binary-choice logit model for the flag-
out decisions of ship operators from closed and open registries separately. The goodness 
of fit statistics (χ2) are all well above 46.963, the critical value for significance at the 0.01 
level for 27 degrees of freedom. 
Most of the estimated coefficients of the two models are significant. There are 
significant differences in the sign of some variables between these two models, 
suggesting that when deciding flagging-out, operators from closed register countries and 
those from the open registers think differently. The results are explained next.  
Table 4:  Estimation of flag-out decision (binary choice model)  
Parameter 
Operators from closed registers Operators from open registers 
Estimate P-Value 
Marginal 
Probability Estimate P-Value 
Marginal 
Probability 
 INTERCEPT -5.899 <.0001   -7.304 0.011  
Vessel characteristics       
 BUILTOPER -0.700 <.0001 -0.173 -1.340 <.0001 -0.269 
 LDWT 0.479 <.0001 0.119 0.191 <.0001 0.047 
 REAGE 0.028 <.0001 0.007 0.037 <.0001 0.009 
 BULK -0.455 <.0001 -0.113 -0.076 0.485 -0.018 
 TANKER -0.611 <.0001 -0.151 -0.136 0.162 -0.033 
 CONTAINER -0.068 0.210 -0.017 -0.233 0.070 -0.056 
 CNIK 2.078 <.0001 0.414 -0.600 <.0001 -0.141 
 CGEL 1.785 <.0001 0.366 -0.235 0.128 -0.056 
 CLLR 0.617 <.0001 0.148 -0.970 <.0001 -0.213 
 CBUV 0.839 <.0001 0.196 -0.549 0.000 -0.127 
 CDNV 0.596 <.0001 0.143 -0.449 0.006 -0.105 
 CABS 0.717 <.0001 0.169 -0.851 <.0001 -0.190 
 CCCS -0.112 0.116 -0.028 -0.986 <.0001 -0.212 
 CRUS 0.481 <.0001 0.116 0.747 0.029 0.184 
 CSKR -0.237 0.002 -0.059 -0.749 0.000 -0.167 
 CREI -0.116 0.306 -0.029 -0.443 0.195 -0.103 
Characteristics for the country of origin       
 TOPMATAX 0.010 <.0001 0.002 -0.050 0.284 -0.012 
 LGDPCAP 0.088 <.0001 0.022 0.690 0.004 0.169 
 AFRICA 1.066 <.0001 0.236 -0.484 0.782 -0.112 
 ASIA 0.047 0.820 0.012 -1.249 0.136 -0.303 
 EUROPE -0.268 0.189 -0.067 0.061 0.914 0.015 
 AMERICA 0.056 0.801 0.014       
Difference between the country of origin and the open registry country  
 DINSPECT 0.584 <.0001 0.145 -0.4470 0.6508 -0.109 
 DFSPERFORM -0.296 <.0001 -0.074 -0.0661 0.6773 -0.016 
 DLOSSRATE 1.819 <.0001 0.453 -2.867 0.362 -0.701 
 DCOMPANY -0.064 <.0001 -0.016 0.080 0.782 0.019 
 DCREW 0.103 <.0001 0.026 0.218 0.121 0.053 
Observations 35614     4939     
χ2 13764     857     
Note:  The results from taking the shipowner as the decision maker are similar, hence omitted.   
 
• BUILTOPER  
The coefficient is negative, indicating that vessels built in an operator’s country are 
less likely to flag out, and those built in a foreign country are more likely to. This may be 
because of the requirements involved in securing government subsidies in shipbuilding; 
ships built using subsidies have to use the national register. It may also be because of the 
huge import tax that prevents ships built in a foreign shipyard from flying a national flag. 
The marginal probability indicates that if the shipbuilding country is the same as the 
operator’s country, the probability of flag-out will decrease by 0.17.  
• LDWT 
The positive coefficient suggests that large vessels are more likely to choose a foreign 
flag: most large vessels deployed on international trade routes are in close competition, 
and flying a foreign flag helps to cut the costs.  
• REAGE  
The positive coefficient implies that older vessels are likely to flag-out. When a ship 
becomes old, it costs more to maintain the ship to a high standard. To reduce costs, it may 
have to register in an open register where the requirements are low.  
• BULK, TANKER and CONTAINER 
The negative coefficients suggest that bulk and tanker vessels are less likely to flag 
out compared with dry cargo vessels. The coefficient for CONTAINER is not significant, 
suggesting that the flag-out behaviour for container vessels and dry cargo vessels is 
similar. For all vessel types, tankers show the least possibility of flagging out. This may 
be because tankers carry energy resources such as crude oil or gas, which are typically 
controlled by the government and can only be carried by the national fleet. Being 
registered under a national flag may therefore confer certain privileges. Another reason 
may be that tankers are less likely to have an accident (Hoffmann et al., 2005), especially 
since the stringent vetting process developed by the Oil Companies International Marine 
Forum came into force in 1989. Therefore, tankers are less motivated to flag out to enjoy 
flexible requirements on safety.  
• Dummy variables for IACS members 
The estimated coefficients are the opposite for operators from closed registry 
countries and those from open ones. Also, most of the coefficients are significant. 
However, for the former, most of the coefficients are positive, whereas for the latter 
group most are negative. These results indicate that closed registry countries tend to flag-
out IACS classified vessels. Normally, these vessels are also high quality and comply 
with international safety and environmental standards. They are flagged-out for 
operational cost savings and flexibilities, not for lower quality or safety requirements. 
However, for open registry countries, ships with IACS classification are less motivated to 
flag-out than those with non-IACS classification. In other words, the statistical results 
reveal that open registry countries tend to flag-out lower quality vessels.  
• Characteristics of the country of origin 
The coefficients for TOPMARTAX and LGDPCAP indicate that a high tax rate and 
GDP per capita motivate operators to flag out, in order to save on operating costs. This is 
also reflected in previous research by Hoffmann et al. (2005). The coefficients for the 
country location dummies are not significant, except for Africa, indicating that there is no 
significant difference in flagging out decisions among ship operators in different regions, 
except on that continent. 
• Differences between the country of origin and the open registry country 
All the coefficients are significant for ships from closed registry countries, but not for 
those from open registry countries. This may be due to the fact that for the variables in 
this group there are no significant differences between open registers. For ships from the 
closed registry countries, the DINSPECT is positive, indicating that the high PSC 
inspection rate in the country of origin increases the probability of flag-out. In other 
words, ship operators prefer to register in a country with a low PSC inspection rate.  
The negative coefficient on DFSPERFORM indicates that ships whose country of 
origin has a higher FSC performance value (that is, worse FSC enforcement) will not flag 
out. This in turn indicates that ship operators prefer to register in a country that does not 
enforce relevant international laws and regulations strictly.   
However, ship operators do care about the safety of the ship. This can be inferred 
from the coefficient of the loss rate, DLOSSRATE. The estimated coefficient is positive 
and significant, revealing that if the ship’s country of origin has a high loss rate then the 
operator will flag out.  If it has a lower loss rate, the operator will fly the national flag. In 
other words, the effort spent on improving the safety record of a country could have a 
positive impact on retaining ships in its national fleet.  
The negative coefficient on DCOMPANY indicates that stringent requirements on the 
ownership of company shares will actually reduce flagging out, which goes against the 
feeling that stricter regulations will motivate the operator to flag out. This is because 
those countries that have higher requirements (the value for column 4 in Table 4) are also 
the largest ship controlling countries, such as the US, China and Greece. Therefore, the 
number of ships flagged-out from these countries is also high. The coefficient of 
DCREW suggests that the stricter the nationality requirement on the crew in the 
operator’s country, the more likely it is that the vessel will flag out.  
In conclusion, the statistical results indicate that owners of vessels from closed registry 
countries make flag-out decisions differently to those from open registry countries. For 
the former, the vessel type, characteristics of the country of origin, and policy differences 
between the country of origin and the open registers are the key factors in making a 
flagging out decision. While the operators prefer a flag state with lower PSC inspections 
and flexible FSC, they still prefer flags with a lower loss rate. This implies that effort 
expended maintaining quality shipping pays off. For the open registry group, the 
differences between the country of origin and the open registers are not significant. The 
closed registry countries tends to flag out good quality vessels, while the open registry 
group often puts lower quality vessels under foreign flags.  
5.2. Results from the nested logit model of flag choice 
In determining which flag to choose from among all the open registers, we adopt the 
Nested Logit model, which assumes that there are structural differences among all the 
alternatives. Open registers are not homogeneous—some enforce national and 
international maritime policies, while others just treat the register as a source of revenue. 
According to previous research (Hill Dickinson LLP, 2008), four open registers are 
identified as not completely FOC countries, namely the Bahamas, Cambodia, Hong Kong 
and Singapore. These are treated as a ‘quasi-open’ group. Other open registers are 
classified under ‘full-open’ group.  
To justify the application of the nested model, we examined the IIA property using the 
Hausman-McFadden test  (Greene, 2008; Hausman & McFadden, 1984) introduced in 
section three. The test statistics are 3291.0 and 75.0 for vessels from closed and open 
registry countries respectively, these being larger than the critical value of 38.93(
)21(299.0χ ) and 37.57 ( )20(
2
99.0χ ). Therefore, the IIA assumption is rejected, and the 
conditional logit model is not appropriate for modelling the flag choices.   
Ships from both closed registry and open registry countries may choose to flag out. Do 
they behave in the same way? To test this, we also ran two separate regression analyses—
one for ships originating from closed registry countries, the other for those from open 
ones. The closed registry group includes 82% of the ships in this analysis, and has 13 
flags to choose from; while the open registry group comprises only one tenth of the 
sample size (foreign flagged vessels, 26,366), and has only 12 flags to choose from. In 
the event that the ship’s country of origin is one of the 12 alternatives, it is reduced to 11 
choices.   
For each analysis, we assume that the decision maker will first decide which nest to 
choose from—the ‘full-open’ group or the ‘quasi-open’ one. The next step is to choose a 
specific flag within that nest by comparing the choice-specific characteristics of each 
alternative. Table 5 shows the results from the nested logit model.  
Table 5:  Estimates of the nested logit model  
  Operators from closed registers Operators from open registers 
Parameter Estimate P-value Estimate        P-value 
Panama_L1 2.254 <.0001 2.923 <.0001 
Liberia_L1 1.384 <.0001 1.721 <.0001 
Malta_L1 0.373 <.0001 0.923 <.0001 
Antigua_L1 1.781 <.0001 0.473 0.034 
Marshall Islands_L1 0.148 0.030 1.234 <.0001 
Bahamas_L1 -3.011 0.000 0.526 0.535 
Hong Kong_L1 -5.025 <.0001 -1.569 0.092 
Singapore_L1 -2.881 0.001 -0.456 0.596 
Cyprus_L1 -0.477 <.0001 0.219 0.276 
Cambodia_L1 -6.496 <.0001 -2.793 0.003 
Isle of Man_L1 -5.137 <.0001   
Gibraltar_L1 -2.883 <.0001   
Honduras_L1   -0.310 0.126 
LRFEE_L1 -0.873 <.0001 -0.893 <.0001 
LAFEE_L1 -0.260 <.0001 -0.277 <.0001 
DAREA_L1 0.761 <.0001 0.833 <.0001 
OPEN×BULK_L2G1 0.407 <.0001 0.468 0.016 
OPEN×TANKER_L2G1 0.100 0.103 0.468 0.011 
OPEN×CONTAINER_L2G1 0.684 <.0001 0.553 0.035 
OPEN×REAGE_L2G1 -0.004 0.078 0.006 0.297 
OPEN×DINSPECT -0.279 <.0001 1.314 0.001 
OPEN×DFSPERFORM -0.336 <.0001 0.353 0.001 
OPEN×DLOSSRATE 1.197 <.0001 -4.177 0.001 
INC_L2G1C1 0.648 <.0001 0.934 0.001 
INC_L2G1C2 0.481 <.0001 0.776 0.000 
Observations 17202  2107 
χ2 16735  2354 
Log L -35755  -3875 
The coefficients of the inclusive variables (INC_L2G1C1 and INC_L2G1C2) are 
between 0 and 1. This indicates that the nested specification is consistent with flag 
selection behaviour. The likelihood ratio between the conditional logit model and the 
nested one is used to test the null hypothesis that the nested logit model is not 
significantly different from the conditional logit model. The test statistics for operators 
from closed registry countries is 88 (= )]799,35(799,35[2 −−−− )4
For vessels from closed registry countries, with St. Vincent as the reference flag, the 
countries with positive coefficients suggest that, all other things being equal, the 
probability of choosing that flag is larger when compared to St. Vincent, whereas 
negative coefficients indicate that the probability of choosing that flag is smaller. All the 
coefficients for the quasi-open registers are lower, indicating the relatively low 
probability compared with St. Vincent. The Marshall Islands is not significant, probably 
because there is not much difference between this flag and St. Vincent’s.     
. The 1% critical value 
from the χ2-distribution with 2 degrees of freedom is 9.21. Therefore, we can conclude 
that the nested logit model is statistically different from the conditional logit model.  The 
test statistics for ships from open registers are similar.  
The negative coefficients of LRFEE and LAFEE suggest that an increase in the 
registration fee or annual due of a flag will reduce the attractiveness of that flag. A 1% 
increase in the registration fee for a particular country will decrease the probability of 
choosing that flag by 0.582% (1-exp(-0.873)). Similarly, a 1% increase in the annual due 
of a country will decrease the probability by 0.228%. It is logical that the preference for a 
flag will decrease with its registration fee and annual tonnage due. However, it is not 
obvious that the preference is more sensitive to the registration fee than to annual dues. 
This implies that the decision maker cares more about the up-front costs at the time of 
registration than any future costs. Regarding the geographical indicator, the positive 
coefficient on the variable DAREA indicates that the ship operator is more likely to 
choose a flag if the flag country is in the same continent. 
The variables with an OPEN prefix are nest-specific variables for selecting a nest—a 
positive coefficient implies that it will increase the probability of choosing the full-open 
nest. Our result shows that, compared with dry cargo vessels, all other ship types prefer a 
full-open nest. For ships originating from a closed registry country, the negative 
coefficient on REAGE suggests that newer vessels are more likely to choose full-open 
registers than older ones are.  
With respect to the comparison of PSC, FSC and safety records between vessels’ 
countries of origin and open registers, there are significant differences in nest preference 
between operators from closed registry countries and those from open registers. Most of 
the countries in the former group have lower PSC inspection rates, stricter FSC (lower 
DFSPERFORM), and better safety records, but there are still variations among these 
countries. The negative coefficient of DINSPECT means that if the operator’s country of 
origin has a lower inspection rate, it will prefer a full-open group. The negative 
coefficient of DFSPERFORM indicates that if the country of origin has stricter FSC, or 
the full-open flag has flexible FSC, it will prefer a full-open nest. The positive coefficient 
4 The two numbers in the square brackets are the log-likelihood values. The first one is from the conditional 
logit model, while the second one is from the nested logit one. 
of DLOSSRATE indicates that if the country of origin has a high loss rate, it will prefer a 
full-open group. In short, vessels originating from closed registry countries with a lower 
PSC inspection rate, stricter FSC and a worse safety record will prefer a full-open group.  
The sign for the same three variables for operators from open registry countries are 
just the opposite of those stated above. This may be because these ships are already in 
open registry countries. The reason for them to flag out is to find a particular register that 
has lower requirements, as they cannot maintain the standards of their countries of origin. 
Therefore, ships whose country of origin has a higher PSC inspection rate, a loose FSC 
and a better safety record will still register in some other full-open registers.       
Owing to the substitution effect, a change in the registration fee of one flag will also 
affect the probability of selecting other flags. The level of substitution can be measured 
by elasticity, which is the percentage change of the chosen probability w.r.t. (with respect 
to) a one percent change in a variable. This elasticity can be calculated using the next 
equation, following Greene (2008): 
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where (j*, k*) indicates the alternatives with a registration fee change, and (j, k) for any 
other alternatives impacted by the registration fee change in (j*, k*). Table 6 summarizes 
the estimated elasticity of the probabilities w.r.t. the registration fee in all the open-
registers, based on the operators from closed registry countries.   
Each column in Table 6 contains the elasticity of the probability for all the open 
registry countries w.r.t. the registration fee of one country identified in the header. For 
example, the first column is the elasticity of all the countries w.r.t. the registration fee in 
Panama. Defining own-elasticity as the elasticity of one particular flag with its own 
registration fee change, cross-elasticity as the elasticity of that country for the registration 
fee change of a flag in the same nest, and cross-nest elasticity as that for a registration fee 
change in another nest, the results of this table can be summarized as follows: 
1. Negative own-elasticity: An increase in the registration fee of a flag country will 
always decrease its preference. All of them are inelastic.  
2. Positive cross-elasticity and cross-nest elasticity: Increasing the registration fee in 
one country will increase the preference for all other countries. A registration fee 
change for large open registers will result in higher cross-elasticity.  
3. All cross-elasticities and cross-nest elasticities are equal. This conforms with the 
IIA requirement of the nested logit model: IIA only holds within a nest, not across 
nests (Train, 2003).  
4. Cross-elasticity is always larger than cross-nest elasticity: Flags in the same nest 
are closer substitutes than those in a different nest. For example, it is relatively 
difficult for Hong Kong to attract vessels that are currently registered in Panama, 
as the latter has a much looser registration system. However, Hong Kong can be a 
close competitor of Singapore, the Bahamas, or Cambodia, as they are similar in 
nature.  
 
Table 6:  Elasticity of likelihood to be chosen with respect to registration fee 
Effect on Panama Liberia Malta Antigua Marshall Islands Cyprus St Vincent 
Panama -0.554 0.130 0.082 0.077 0.062 0.044 0.023 
Liberia 0.319 -0.743 0.082 0.077 0.062 0.044 0.023 
Malta 0.319 0.130 -0.791 0.077 0.062 0.044 0.023 
Antigua 0.319 0.130 0.082 -0.796 0.062 0.044 0.023 
Marshall Islands 0.319 0.130 0.082 0.077 -0.811 0.044 0.023 
Cyprus 0.319 0.130 0.082 0.077 0.062 -0.830 0.023 
St Vincent 0.319 0.130 0.082 0.077 0.062 0.044 -0.850 
Isle of Man 0.319 0.130 0.082 0.077 0.062 0.044 0.023 
Gibraltar 0.319 0.130 0.082 0.077 0.062 0.044 0.023 
Bahamas 0.142 0.058 0.037 0.034 0.028 0.019 0.010 
Hong Kong 0.142 0.058 0.037 0.034 0.028 0.019 0.010 
Singapore 0.142 0.058 0.037 0.034 0.028 0.019 0.010 
Cambodia 0.142 0.058 0.037 0.034 0.028 0.019 0.010 
Effect on Isle of Man Gibraltar Bahamas Hong Kong Singapore Cambodia 
Panama 0.017 0.016 0.032 0.028 0.024 0.017 
Liberia 0.017 0.016 0.032 0.028 0.024 0.017 
Malta 0.017 0.016 0.032 0.028 0.024 0.017 
Antigua 0.017 0.016 0.032 0.028 0.024 0.017 
Marshall Islands 0.017 0.016 0.032 0.028 0.024 0.017 
Cyprus 0.017 0.016 0.032 0.028 0.024 0.017 
St Vincent 0.017 0.016 0.032 0.028 0.024 0.017 
Isle of Man -0.856 0.016 0.032 0.028 0.024 0.017 
Gibraltar 0.017 -0.857 0.032 0.028 0.024 0.017 
Bahamas 0.008 0.007 -0.705 0.153 0.123 0.084 
Hong Kong 0.008 0.007 0.169 -0.720 0.123 0.084 
Singapore 0.008 0.007 0.169 0.153 -0.750 0.084 
Cambodia 0.008 0.007 0.169 0.153 0.123 -0.790 
Note:  Countries under the dotted line are quasi-open flags. 
 
In summary, the results from the nested logit model reveal the structural differences 
among major open registers. In general, the preference for an open register is more 
sensitive to the registration fee than the annual due. Facing an increase in registration fee, 
own-elasticity is higher for flags in the full-open group than for those in the quasi-open 
group, whilst the cross-elasticity is higher than the cross-nest elasticity. This means that 
competition in the full-open group is higher than that in the quasi-open one. Ships from 
closed registry countries with a lower PSC inspection rate, stricter FSC and worse safety 
record prefer flags in the full-open group, whereas ships from open registry countries 
prefer the opposite.  
6. Summary, conclusion and implication 
This study analyzes the behaviour of decision-makers with regard to ship registration; 
whether or not to fly a foreign flag and, if the decision is to fly a foreign flag, which flag 
to fly. It does this by applying binary choice models and nested logit models to the 
observed vessel registration data for ships in the world merchant fleet, together with ship 
characteristics, economic and policy conditions of flag states, and geographical 
relationships. The model assumes that the utility of the decision makers for flag choice 
can be revealed through the actual flags flown on each ship, and that the utilities consist 
of an observable part derived from the actual data, and an unobserved random part with 
extreme-value distribution.    
The binary-choice logit model reveals that flagging out decisions are different for 
vessels from closed registration countries compared with those from open registry 
countries. The major difference is that vessels flagged-out from closed registration 
countries tend to be high quality ships, whereas those from open registration countries 
tend to be lower quality. With regard to the significance and relevance of other important 
factors, such as vessel characteristics, vessel national country characteristics, and cost 
related factors, our results are consistent with a previous study (Hoffmann et al., 2005). In 
addition, we find that the policy on crew nationality requirements is a very significant 
factor in the flag-out decision. If the differences in this policy measure are higher 
between the vessel’s national flag and the open registers, it will be more inclined to flag 
out. This indicates the importance of marine policy in ship registration; the principal 
reason for a vessel to flag out is for trade flexibilities and lower operating costs. If a 
country’s policy objective is to develop a national shipping industry for the induced 
economic benefits, it may wish to relax its requirement on crew nationality, or set up its 
own second register. However, it is necessary to maintain a good safety record for its 
national fleet, as this can attract more ships to fly the national flag.   
In analyzing the flag choice issue, we applied a nested logit model to capture the 
differences between full-open flags and quasi-open flags. The result shows that the high 
loss-rate of the country of origin has a positive impact on the choice of a full open 
register for the decision makers from closed-registration countries, whereas it has a 
negative impact on the choice of a full open register for open-registration countries. 
Quasi-open flags are less sensitive to the registration fee than full-open registers. 
Meanwhile cross-elasticity is greater than cross-nest elasticity, indicating closer 
competition among flags in the same nest as opposed to those in different nests. A 
country aiming to attract more ships, will find it more practical to compete with registers 
with a similar registration system.  
The results show that the probability of choosing a particular flag will decrease with 
an increase in its registration fee and annual tonnage due, and that the flag choice is more 
sensitive to the registration fee than the annual tonnage due. For the ship operators from 
closed registry countries, if the country of origin has a lower PSC inspection rate, stricter 
FSC and worse safety record, they will prefer a full-open group. In contrast, those from 
open registry countries prefer a full-open group if the country of origin has a higher PSC 
inspection rate, loose FSC and better safety record.  
While most of the opposition to an open registry stems from poor safety and manning 
practices (Thuong, 1987), it is necessary to differentiate between different open registers. 
The quasi-open countries are able to maintain efficient safety control without sacrificing 
the benefits provided by an open register. For example, Singapore passed the Merchant 
Shipping Regulations in 1981 to tighten up the registry requirements for foreign ships, 
converting its shipping registry to quasi-FOC (Toh & Phang, 1993). Hong Kong has also 
introduced strict entry criteria, refusing older ships and insisting on vessel inspections 
globally. Therefore, more resources should be put into PSC inspections for the higher 
priority flags, in order to change the inclination of decision makers to select a flag with a 
bad safety record.  
This study also provides an opportunity to calculate the marginal utility of each 
individual attribute (policy regulation with fees and charges), so that the traditional 
maritime nations can estimate the monetary value of their national maritime policy, and 
then use it to prevent the loss of their national fleet to foreign flags. Open registers can 
make use of this trade-off between policy measures and monetary measures, so as to 
justify the cost of enforcing the international maritime safety regulations.  
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